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Evidence about the value of financial statement audit in the public sector  
Abstract: 
Multiple, complementary explanations have been developed to explain audit demand. 
Substantial evidence exists for these explanations in the private sector, but they have been 
explored to a lesser extent in the public sector. We assess the extent to which these 
explanations for the value of auditing are relevant in the public sector by examining evidence 
from New Zealand. We find the use of overlapping explanations helps to explain how 
auditing is valuable to a wide variety of users.  
 
Impact 
This paper uses empirical evidence to examine the private sector explanations for audit in the 
public sector setting. It argues that attention to these arguments can assist Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAIs) in articulating how public sector audits can demonstrate their ongoing 






Evidence about the value of financial statement audit in the public sector  
 
Introduction  
There is growing interest in the value of public sector audit, especially in respect of 
performance audits (Barrett, 2012; Talbot & Wiggan, 2010), but Bonollo (2019) highlights 
that the value of financial statement audits in this setting is under-researched, and it tends to 
be under-theorised. There is also a geographical and methodological divide between public 
sector auditing research and the larger body of research in the private sector (Goddard, 2010, 
p. 76; Hay & Cordery, 2018, p. 2), whereby much public sector auditing research does not 
make reference to the more well-established explanations for the value of auditing.  Yet 
public sector and private sector auditing are similar enough that it is worth investigating to 
what extent the more widely used private sector explanations are relevant and therefore could 
be used to undertake a broader range of discussions of public sector audit. The public sector 
provides auditing researchers with an opportunity to test their understanding of the reasons 
for auditing and the ways it achieves value. The objective of this research is to assess to what 
extent stakeholders perceive value in public sector financial statement auditing and examine 
private sector explanations in this regard. The explanations examined are the agency 
explanation; signalling; insurance; management control; governance; and the confirmation 
hypothesis. We demonstrate to what extent the explanations are relevant to public sector 
stakeholders. We use evidence from stakeholders in New Zealand. This jurisdiction is an 
example with relevance to many others with similar public sector audit institutions. The paper 
argues that attention to audit explanations can assist Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in 
articulating how public sector audits can demonstrate their ongoing relevance to citizens, 
Parliament and other stakeholders. 
The value of audit is a very relevant issue to SAIs. Most SAIs (including New Zealand’s) have 
agreed to follow the International Standards for Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs). One of 
the standards, ISSAI 12 (International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, 2013), 
explains that public sector auditing makes a difference to the lives of citizens; that an 
independent, effective and credible SAI is an essential component in a democratic system; and 
that SAIs have a responsibility to demonstrate their ongoing relevance to citizens, Parliament 
and other stakeholders.   
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Auditing in the New Zealand public sector is organised under the Westminster system and 
therefore is conducted under the direction of the Controller and Auditor-General, who is the 
head of the SAI, the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG). The authors were invited to conduct 
this research to help meet the goal to assess the extent to which the OAG as an SAI was relevant 
to stakeholders1. New Zealand is known for public sector innovations, and was a leader in the 
adoption of New Public Management (NPM) (Grossi et al., 2009; Pallot, 2003). 
This paper explores explanations that are used widely in auditing research but have not yet 
been widely applied in the public sector. Our contribution is finding that public audit is valuable 
to a wide range of stakeholders in different ways, in accordance with several of the explanations 
for the value of auditing, but not all. We also make recommendations about potential changes 
to audit practice. We now turn to the explanations of the demand for auditing. Our research 
method is explained along with the context, and the findings presented, before conclusions 
made along with recommendations for practice and further research. 
Explanations of the demand for auditing 
To assess the value of auditing in the public sector, we examined previous auditing literature 
and summarised explanations for auditing from previous research (Hay & Cordery, 2018). Here 
we review these explanations and the extent of relevant evidence, as summarised in columns 
(2) to (4) of Table 1.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Agency: One way in which auditing is valuable is by reducing agency costs to facilitate 
monitoring and bonding. Where one party, the principal, delegates authority to the agent, then 
the agent might be self-interested and spend money for their own benefit; or might shirk; or 
might be misguided (Wallace, 1987). If nothing is done to avoid these risks, then the principal 
will spend less; or will avoid entering into the transactions altogether. Agency costs include 
those that arise when otherwise useful activities are not undertaken because the risks are too 
high that the self-interested agent will take advantage of the situation; or when the principal 
expends effort in overseeing the agent. An agent might appoint an auditor in order to give the 
principal more confidence, reducing these agency costs (Chow, 1982). There is historical 
evidence that audits were arranged voluntarily in this way in some settings (Chow, 1982; 
                                       




Wallace, 1980). Agency theory has been used to explain issues related to financial reporting 
and auditing in previous public sector studies (e.g., Baber, 1983; Bradbury & Scott, 2015; 
Ingram, 1984; Jensen & Payne, 2005; Zimmerman, 1977). Agency relationships in the public 
sector are more complex than in the private sector as there are several levels of relationship 
(Streim, 1994). Moe (1984, p. 765) states that: 
Democratic politics are easily viewed in principal-agent terms. Citizens are 
principals, politicians are their agents. Politicians are principals, bureaucrats are 
their agents. The whole of politics is therefore structured by a chain of principal-
agent relationships, from citizen to politician to bureaucratic subordinate and on 
down the hierarchy to the lowest-level bureaucrats. 
As a result, in the public sector there are more agency relationships than in private sector 
settings, and therefore a wider variety of reasons why auditing could be important. Citizens 
might need to hold politicians to account; politicians in Parliament to oversee the government; 
and government Ministers to hold bureaucrats accountable. Ferry and Eckersley (2015) explain 
agency arrangements in the accountability required of local authorities in the United Kingdom 
(and the changes to those). This echoes expectations of principal-agent relationships which are 
experienced in central government.  
Agency theory is sometimes depicted as a subset of contracting theory. Williamson (1985) 
interprets the contract metaphor as being either a legally binding agreement or a relational, 
incomplete contract (sometimes referred to as a ‘social contract’). Information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent/s disturbs these contracts and may be alleviated by audit. 
While arguably there have always been agency concerns in the public sector, the NPM of the 
1980s and 1990s in many Western countries, drew inspiration from agency theory and 
transaction cost economics (Boston, 2011; Pallot, 2003).  
Signalling: Managers of private sector companies have better information about the value and 
quality of their business than outside investors do (‘information asymmetry’). If managers 
make statements in the financial report claiming that their business is a better investment than 
others, their claims may not be believed. Signalling is provided by engaging a higher quality 
auditor (or engaging an auditor voluntarily). Governments have reasons to attract investors (for 
example in bonds), meaning there are public sector parallels to this explanation. Other 
stakeholders such as voters also suffer from information asymmetry, accordingly information 
asymmetry may also apply more widely in the public sector (Wallace, 1987). There are studies 
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(Gore, 2004) that find evidence of signalling in a local government bond market context, but 
no evidence at a central government level or outside the US, so that research investigating this 
issue at a national level is worthwhile. 
Insurance: Stakeholders may demand audits to allow them to take legal action against the 
auditor if they need to recover investment losses (Chow 1982). Wallace (1980) suggests that 
an audit in the public sector can provide ‘political insurance’ whereby governments might use 
auditors to take some of the blame when there are management or accounting failures by public 
sector managers. Few studies examine this effect in the public sector so more research will be 
useful ( Green & Singleton, 2009; Hay & Cordery, 2018; and Ross, 1995 report incidences of 
the OAG being liable for losses).  
Management control: Management control for the benefit of internal management is another 
explanation for the value of auditing. Abdel-khalik (1993) showed that private companies are 
more likely to choose to have an audit voluntarily when they have more layers of hierarchy. 
While the audit of a public sector entity is not primarily intended to provide information for 
the entity’s top management, nevertheless the audit provides them with assurance about what 
is occurring in the remote corners of the entity. Hay (2003) shows that where public sector 
activities are more decentralised, then more use is made of accounting. Schillemans, van Twist, 
van der Steen et al. (2018) discuss the potential for internal audit to accomplish this in the 
public sector. Nevertheless, there is a lack of direct evidence about auditing and the function 
of management control in the public sector.  
Corporate governance: Auditing can be useful as an element of corporate governance for 
organisations whose stakeholders are subject to higher risk. Greater emphasis on corporate 
governance is a feature of the NPM (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 2016). In most studies, 
stronger audit committees are associated with higher quality auditors (Hay, Stewart, & Botica 
Redmayne, 2017). However, there are public sector studies that show opposite results (Botica 
Redmayne, Bradbury, & Cahan, 2011), implying that our study can contribute in this area.  
The confirmation hypothesis: Announcements by companies, such as profit announcements, 
often have little impact on share prices (Ball & Brown, 1968). As a result, the release of detailed 
audited financial information is sometimes regarded as less important than announcements of 
new, price-sensitive information. Under the confirmation hypothesis, audited announcements 
about past financial performance and position are important because they verify the earlier 
unaudited announcements (Ball, Jayaraman, & Shivakumar, 2012). Auditing is valuable 
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because it allows both unaudited and audited information to be relevant. However, with the 
exception of Ball et al. (Ball et al., 2012) there is no evidence as yet in either the private sector 
or the public sector and more investigation is needed.  
In review, there is some evidence about the value of public audit, but there are also considerable 
gaps. Bonollo (2019) observes a need for more theorisation in research on public sector 
accounting. In this study, we assist in this effort by applying six mainstream explanations 
(discussed above) that are well-established in auditing research.  
The economic explanations for the value of auditing are relevant to understanding current 
issues, even in settings where auditing is required by law. The explanations that we discuss 
explain how demand for auditing arises naturally, since there are many reasons why managers 
would choose auditors of their own accord. Although auditing is regulated in most settings 
(Bini, 2019), the economic explanations for auditing are nevertheless useful to explain why 
auditing has a strong position that has not been weakened by notorious auditing scandals or 
governmental reforms.  
 
Research context and method 
The Auditor-General of New Zealand is responsible for the financial statement audits of all 
public sector entities, some of which are outsourced to accounting firms. Approximately 87% 
of the work of the OAG is financial statement auditing on which we concentrate. The legislation 
defines which entities are to be audited by the Auditor-General (Buchanan & Simpkins, 2001), 
and the list includes virtually all of the public sector, including for example state-owned 
enterprises (even where listed on the stock exchange), local councils and their subsidiaries, 
universities and schools. All local government entities are also audited by the OAG. 
Following the request to assess the extent to which the OAG was relevant to its stakeholders, 
we gathered a range of qualitative and quantitative data including interviews and focus groups 
with OAG staff, observations and documents (see Table 2). The interview and focus group data 
were recorded and transcribed, with participants reviewing the transcripts before they were 
analysed. Staff were assured of anonymity, therefore where we quote interviewees, we use 
three sets of pseudonyms to indicate the area in which the staff member/s work. These are: PT 
(Policy Team), SM (Sector Managers) and OA (Other Areas). Individuals are identified 
numerically within that schema. Appropriate ethics approval for the interviews and focus 
groups was obtained. The OAG already collects substantial documentary evidence itself, 
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including interviews with key elected representatives, public sector officials conducted by 
professional research companies. We also examined surveys of stakeholders in general. 
Further, we had available to us OAG records of news media reports on public sector auditing 
activities, and audit documents such as management letters. As these extensive sources were 
available to us, we did not carry out further collection of data from external sources. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Review of explanations and evidence 
Column (5) of Table 1 summarises the evidence. The relevant evidence included audit reports, 
other reports to Parliament, management letters, a survey of stakeholders, and reports from 
Parliamentary committees.  
Agency: The auditor communicates with stakeholders through the audit report. Information 
about the number of audits is available from the Annual Report (Controller and Auditor-
General, 2015a). We analysed a summary of the audit reports issued for the 2015/16 year, and 
examined the modified opinions.  
There are modified audit reports that have received qualified opinions over the limited control 
on information from third party providers (e.g. in health). One entity received an adverse audit 
opinion due to not recognising museum assets and another an emphasis of matter, arising from 
uncertainties from the Canterbury earthquakes. In local government, 40 of 720 audit reports 
were modified: 3 with a disclaimer of opinion, 5 an adverse opinion and 32 qualified 
(Controller and Auditor-General, 2016a). Generally, these entities were small, although one of 
the qualified opinions was for a local authority (typically a substantial entity). Many of the 
same entities received modified opinions in both the 2013/4 and 2014/5 years (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2015b, 2016a) and the Local Government and Environment Select 
Committee did not raise the issue of modifications as a matter of concern. We did not find other 
evidence of substantial impact from these opinions on other principals (such as citizens, voters 
and ratepayers), or agents (such as chief executives). 
In contrast, there is evidence that Select Committees find audit reports useful. Select 
Committees represent Parliament and are one set of principals to whom Ministers are 
responsible in the agency relationship. According to The World Bank (2001, p. 2), the 
Westminster model of auditing includes the SAI reporting to a multiparty Public Accounts 
Committee which will also call other witnesses and report “to the full parliament for comment 
and action”. In New Zealand, reports from the Auditor-General (Controller and Auditor-
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General, 2012) to Parliament are referred to the multiparty Finance and Expenditure Committee 
(FEC). The FEC may refer a report to another Select Committee, and OAG staff brief or advise 
any of these Select Committees on these reports as required. The Auditor-General (Controller 
and Auditor-General, 2012) attempts to raise the technical capability of Select Committees, as 
called for by Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018) and Santiso (2015). In New Zealand: 
… Parliament has an induction for its new members … [and the OAG] gave each new 
MP (Member of Parliament) a little pack of what they needed to know. (OA1) 
As shown in table 2, we observed Select Committee meetings and examined all of the Select 
Committee reports which had OAG input within a twelve-month period. On one occasion an 
Opposition MP raised the issue of a qualified audit opinion during Parliamentary questions. 
The use of audit opinions, especially modified audit opinions by the Parliamentary Opposition, 
shows that MPs not only find OAG reports useful, but do use them. The drivers behind this use 
are not as apparent as the suggestions that van Helden (2016) calls for.  
Select Committees raised a number of technical financial issues directly from the financial 
reports and audit. These included asset and liability valuation methods, audit qualifications, 
performance measures, and presentation issues. An OAG report on timeliness of reporting of 
public entities was well received, with the FEC stating it should be repeated annually. That 
committee also applauded the OAG report of probity in the public sector. Staff find that with 
the Select Committees: 
...the quality of the questioning and the connection with the topic has been better than 
we’ve seen for years, which is good...there is more engagement on performance 
information...[and they] try and link it into a financial line...But MPs reflect society 
and they’re not all financially literate. And so it can be quite hard for them to pick up 
the financials. We try to help, but it can be quite difficult. (OA1) 
 
Agency relationships also extend to ‘the people’ who are reached through public reports and 
media communications. The media did not discuss public sector financial statement auditing 
very frequently. Local newspapers sometimes discussed the release of the annual report of 
their local council and reported the adoption by local councils of their long term plan (Daily 
Post, 2015; Hibiscus Matters, 2015; Waiuku & Districts Post, 2015). News reports of 
councils adopting their Long Term Plan sometimes included reference to comments by Audit 
New Zealand staff (e.g., Rankin, 2015). 
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News media are a stakeholder with an interest in reporting public information, and are also an 
intermediary with the public and interest groups. The OAG collects information on media 
coverage. We reviewed the OAG’s Media Round Up documents for three selected months (July 
2015, November 2015 and February 2016). These three months, spread throughout the year, 
were sufficient to reach convergence on the issues the media discusses. Many items were about 
various parties suggesting that the Auditor-General should investigate issues, or they 
commented on actions or reports by the Auditor-General. In 2012 the OAG commissioned a 
Media Opinion Audit by Busby Ramshaw Grice (2012). Busby Ramshaw Grice (2012) 
obtained information by interview and questionnaire from 18 media representatives. The media 
representatives respected the Auditor-General and her role in holding people to account (in 
agency terms), and viewed the OAG favourably in comparison to other ‘government’ 
organisations.  
The OAG uses social media in a number of ways to reach citizens directly, and reaches 
substantial numbers of stakeholders. Media outlets used include Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
a blog (http://blog.oag.govt.nz/) and an email mailing list. We did not find references to 
financial reports or audit opinions on social media, however.  
The Auditor-General also regularly makes presentations in communities:  
We’ve said that we would consult with the public on our annual work program and 
this is the first year that we actually have and it - in a formal sense. So we ran a citizen 
panel and we had Colmar Brunton help us to run an online forum and discussion 
group, and we talked to them, to the people involved, members of the public who were 
selected from Colmar Brunton’s pool, about the information theme that we plan to do 
for 2016/17, and asked them about their experiences with getting information and 
sharing …in the public sector. (OA3) 
The development of two-way relationships and consulting citizens are efforts towards moving 
New Zealand’s OAG beyond the conventional one-way citizen relationship where citizens are 
only ‘informed’ but do not respond to the SAI (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 2013). This can help to reduce information asymmetry. 
Signalling: The choice of auditor is one way in which managers can signal that they have high-
quality financial reports. Under the signalling explanation, it can be predicted that when there 
are signals indicating higher quality financial reporting, then announcements of financial good 
10 
 
news will have more impact. At the time of the 1980s reforms to the New Zealand public sector, 
managers of the newly-formed State-Owned Enterprises argued that they should be able to 
appoint audit firms who were members of the then Big 8 to give them greater credibility in 
financial markets (Green & Singleton, 2009; Pallot, 2003). Their arguments were consistent 
with Titman and Trueman (1986) where entrepreneurs choose a more expensive, higher-quality 
auditor as a costly signal that shows investors that they have more favourable information.  
New Zealand has a highly-regarded system of financial reporting, and auditing. Transparency 
International rates perceptions of public sector corruption, including administrative and 
political corruption. New Zealand has been ranked first equal in 2012, 2013 and 2016 
(Transparency International, 2016). The use of international reviews can signal that the OAG 
provides quality audit. In 2008, an Australian team reviewed the OAG. The peer review found 
that the OAG “is a relatively small but highly regarded organisation both in New Zealand and 
internationally” (Barrett, 2008, p. 7). 
This suggests the OAG could be seen as a high-quality auditor. Despite those advantages, 
which the signalling explanation predicts would make a favourable impression on investors, 
New Zealand does not have an unusually high credit rating compared to some other Western 
democracies, nor relatively low interest rates.2 The evidence from interest rates does not 
support the signalling explanation for auditing, but this is probably because other variables 
apart from auditing have a substantial influence. This lack of impact on the markets could be 
due to whether the financial reports are consistent with underlying good or bad news, as well 
as with the quality of the signalling. High interest rates in New Zealand have also been 
explained by the low level of saving in New Zealand (Labuschagne & Vowles, 2010).  
Private sector auditors are now usually subject to independent inspection, and public sector 
auditors like the OAG of NZ are an outlier in not having a statutory requirement for a periodic 
review. The OAG has recently arranged for the Financial Markets Authority to conduct a 
                                       
2 We compared the credit ratings for New Zealand and several countries of similar size or culture from 
Moody’s (https://www.moodys.com/researchandratings/market-segment/sovereign-supranational/-
/005005/005005%7C042089/-/0/0/-/0/-/-/-/-1/-/-/-/en/global/pdf/-/rra), Fitch 
(https://www.fitchratings.com/site/sovereigns) and Standard and Poors 
https://www.capitaliq.com/CIQDotNet/CreditResearch/RenderArticle.aspx?articleId=2094866&SctArtI
d=460712&from=CM&nsl_code=LIME&sourceObjectId=10686413&sourceRevId=1&fee_ind=N&exp_
date=20281001-19:20:54). New Zealand’s credit ratings are lower than or equal to the ratings for 
Australia, Denmark and Norway; lower for certain credit rating agencies and higher for others compared 
to Finland, Ireland and the UK; and consistently higher than those of Iceland. Local media have 
observed that New Zealand has higher interest rates for bank deposits and mortgages than most other 
similar countries except for Iceland (Chaston, 2017; Gibson, 2014).  
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quality review on the audit systems for entities that are required to lodge audited financial 
statements with the Registrar of Companies and that are audited by the OAG (under s. 15A of 
the Public Audit Act 2001). This helps to demonstrate that the OAG itself is a high-quality 
auditor.  
The OAG also undertakes ‘stakeholder engagement’ (within government) which included 
interviews with Select Committees and senior managers of Treasury. Recommendations of 
particular groups are reported verbatim and ascribed to one of the 10 interviewees. Overall, the 
OAG is seen as being helpful in providing appropriate reports and advice. These surveys, 
contracted from consulting firm Touchstone, were augmented in 2014 by Martin Jenkins and 
Associates who surveyed 25 (named) senior public officials and select committee Chairs 
(Controller and Auditor-General, 2015a). Select Committee respondents were satisfied with 
briefings, and the OAG was seen to be “in a strong position and performing well” (Martin 
Jenkins and Associates, 2014, p. 15). These issues have been discussed in depth at senior 
management levels within the OAG and further signals that the OAG provides a quality audit.  
Insurance: The insurance explanation of the demand for auditing can apply if, for example, 
the Auditor-General accepts responsibility for a failure in management control over 
expenditure. This could provide either recovery of financial losses or the ‘political insurance’ 
suggested by (Wallace, 1980). There have been cases where legal action for monetary losses 
has been brought against the Auditor-General of New Zealand in 1949 and in the 1980s (Green 
and Singleton, 2009, pp. 82 and 145). There is a recent case where the OAG accepted 
responsibility, the case of Kaipara District Council. According to Radio New Zealand News 
(2013), Auditor-General Lyn Provost said: “an independent reviewer identified problems with 
some of the audit work carried out by Audit New Zealand. For that, I apologise unreservedly 
to each and every one of you." The Kaipara District Council subsequently took legal action 
against the Auditor-General, so that both financial and political insurance were evident, making 
the insurance explanation even more salient (Ali, 2015). 
Management control: One aspect of the audit function in relation to management control is 
through assessing internal control and providing recommendations to management, through 
management letters. The recommendations provide value to a range of stakeholders including 
management of the entity, those charged with governance, Parliament and possibly wider 
groups of stakeholders. The recommendations made each year are summarised in the annual 
report of the OAG (Illustration 1) (Controller and Auditor-General, 2015a). The information 
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that the OAG uses to prepare the chart in Illustration 1 is drawn from a sample of 45 
management letters for a broad selection of larger entities. We examined those letters. 
INSERT ILLUSTRATION 1 
Illustration 1 shows that the OAG reported on 194 recommendations made in 45 management 
letters, of which 138 (71%) were accepted, 39 noted, 7 rejected and 10 not responded to (Office 
of the Auditor-General, 2016a). We found from reviewing the letters that sometimes, although 
management accepted a recommendation, the problem was not resolved, and the issue was still 
outstanding the following year. One large local authority had six weaknesses in this category. 
We also observed entities with large numbers of weaknesses (as many as 23). OAG briefings 
reported that the management control environment of some entities’ financial information 
system and controls “need improvement”. In at least one case, this situation recurred from the 
previous year. Internationally, the measurement of accepted recommendations has ranged from 
21% (Raudla, Taro, Agu, & Douglas, 2015) but are more typically in the 70-90% range 
(Azuma, 2004; Lonsdale, 2000). Requiring reporting of the number of recommendations 
remediated by the time of the next audit and highlighting those not remediated, would provide 
a stronger measure of whether management takes action on recommendations. It would 
highlight the state of internal control in the New Zealand public sector. Bedard & Graham 
(2014) argue that while reporting on internal control in the United States was initially 
unwelcome, it has had benefits. They suggest that “not far behind is the potential requirement 
that governments publicly report on the effectiveness of their controls as a part of their 
stewardship of public monies” (Bedard & Graham, 2014). No internal control reporting is 
required in the New Zealand public sector, but this offers a potential value adding activity.  
 
Further, the OAG assesses satisfaction of auditees (Controller and Auditor-General, 2015a). It 
undertakes extensive surveys of audit clients, obtaining specific feedback on aspects of the 
audit, auditors’ skills, knowledge and so on. These are reported by service provider and by sub-
sector. The 2015 Colmar Brunton (Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, 2016) survey 
shows satisfaction by audit clients is high – 87% – a 2% increase on the prior year. The OAG 
has a wealth of information to encourage audit service providers, both internal and outsourced, 
to improve in deficient areas.  
Corporate governance: The OAG examined corporate governance in the New Zealand public 
sector in a recent report (Controller and Auditor-General, 2016b). The Auditor-General 
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commented: “In my opinion, the quality of governance in the public sector can be improved. It 
is not working as well as it should in some entities and problems have occurred and will 
continue to do so, unless the standard is raised” (Controller and Auditor-General, 2016b, p. 3). 
Accordingly: 
… one of the things we have been doing and pushing really hard is audit and risk 
committees in local government … When they have a ‘new mayors’ school’ … what we 
did there was push very hard, “you should set up an audit and risk committee” and we 
have said, “you should have independent members on it, because that’s a way to get 
the financial expertise to ask the right questions, into the system”. (OA1) 
Our research found entities which have audit committees, but do not mention them in annual 
reports or websites. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Srinivasan (2005) argue that part of making 
independent directors effective is in putting their personal reputation as experts at risk. 
Therefore we found it surprising that public sector entities were not encouraged to disclose the 
membership and activities of their audit committees.  
Confirmation: Under the confirmation hypothesis, audits retain importance even when 
unaudited information is widely used. This is because the audited financial statements provide 
confirmation of earlier announcements (Ball et al., 2012). This explanation could be highly 
relevant for the public sector, although citizens in their capacity as taxpayers and ratepayers 
are unlikely to consult audited financial statements. Nevertheless, they obtain information from 
sources such as the media or announcements by public sector entities, and they probably 
assume that this information is reliable. It might be useful for auditors to consider what 
unaudited announcements are made, and consider whether they are consistent with the audited 
financial statements that are later released. 
We discussed this issue in focus groups, when staff assumed that data from, for example, local 
authorities’ summary statements to ratepayers, would be derived from audited financial 
statements, but that: 
If you think about the stakeholders … what information do they rely on to know that 
these entities are performing and not diddling them and generally behaving? It’s 
mostly non-audited information isn’t it? It’s statements from politicians, it’s 
unaudited pamphlets and things from their local authorities. It’s Official Information 
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inquiries from journalists. It’s those sort of things. It’s not audited information that 
they directly rely on. (PT 3)  
An example of an unaudited announcement that stakeholders might rely on includes 
announcements by local governments about how much their rates (property taxes) are and what 
they are used for. Illustration 2 provides a recent example from Auckland Council.  
INSERT ILLUSTRATION 2 
In the public sector, unlike the financial market examples that Ball et al. (2012) were referring 
to, there are unlikely to be analysts who would draw attention to any discrepancy between 
earlier announcements and audited results. It could be a valuable part of public auditing to 
check such announcements against audited financial statements.  
Limitations 
Although external documents were used in this research, external parties were not interviewed. 
This is due to the extensive evidence already available from the surveys and interviews 
conducted by or on behalf of the OAG, and the existence of survey fatigue among potential 
respondents. Many of the documents that we examined obtained data from external sources 
including a wide range of stakeholders. Further, the data is a case study from one country only. 
Nevertheless, as New Zealand is considered to be at the forefront of public sector auditing, this 
data provides an example that can be benchmarked and discussed in other jurisdictions that 
have similar public sector audit institutions.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
The objective of our study was to examine the application of explanations for the value of 
private sector auditing in the New Zealand public sector, to highlight possible explanations that 
could be used in public audit studies in light of the dichotomy between private sector and public 
sector auditing research. We therefore examined six explanations for the value of auditing that 
have been found useful in private sector research. We found that some, but not all private sector 
audit explanations were valuable in explaining the value of public audit to stakeholders in 
demonstrating the SAI’s ongoing relevance. Further, our study also shows how complex public 
audit work is as reporting practices must be varied and private sector explanations must be put 
in context. The results are relevant to the needs of the SAI and led to the following findings 
and recommendations.  
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This research has analysed the value of financial statement auditing in the public sector, finding 
that many of the benefits of audit that are supported by research in the private sector are evident 
also in the public sector. Previous research has explored these explanations to a limited extent, 
but has not demonstrated the application of each of the explanations, some of which show that 
public sector audit is valuable to a variety of stakeholders in different ways.  
Agency theory has previously been a useful explanation for public sector auditing, but 
environmental changes render other explanations useful as well, and there is now increasing 
evidence about the ways in which they are useful. Yet, different stakeholders will perceive the 
value of auditing in different ways. For some stakeholders, the value will arise from agency 
issues, for others from signalling or management control, for others corporate governance. 
Signalling could also occur, because the OAG can be shown to be a high-quality auditor, 
although we did not find evidence of economic benefits from this mechanism. Stakeholders 
will see insurance benefits from an audit infrequently, but this will nevertheless occur in some 
cases. There is evidence of increasing benefits from audits in helping management to identify 
potential improvements in control, and in contributing to improved governance. We find less 
evidence of the confirmation hypothesis being useful.  
Nevertheless, one or more of the theoretical models for the value of public audit is found to be 
helpful in explaining the value to each set of stakeholders. The willingness of Opposition 
Members of Parliament to challenge public sector entities as a result of the auditors’ work is 
one example of a growing familiarity with financial and non-financial reporting and a stronger 
focus on agency arrangements. Further, increased reporting on issues raised in management 
letters and recommendations (and the attention to these), suggest that management control may 
be a growing area in which audit can be useful to stakeholders and relevant changes may be 
cost-neutral. The confirmation hypotheses was less likely to be a reason for public audit to have 
value as media has less interest in investigative journalism (Walton, 2010). However, the rise 
of “armchair auditors” (O’Leary, 2015) could see citizens demanding more accountability for 
unaudited results. Overall, this study adds to our evidence about the relevance of these six 
theoretical views of the value of auditing, by demonstrating public sector relevance but also 
recognising the unique context. Accordingly, the public sector provides rich sources for further 
research.  
The OAG utilises extensive sources of feedback on the perceptions of stakeholders. These 
included surveys of stakeholders, media viewpoints on the OAG, and analysis of news reports 
16 
 
and social media. In addition, the added inspection by the Financial Markets Authority will 
provide feedback similar to that which private sector auditors receive. Arguably, the OAG (and 
possibly other SAIs) are in a better position to provide value to stakeholders because of these 
additional feedback sources. However, a wider range of stakeholders is involved (as discussed 
in the quotation earlier from Moe, 1984) and it is likely that the benefits or harm caused by 
public audit will have a greater impact than a private sector audit. For this reason, the OAG 
reports not only to Parliament, but also publicly, is open about stakeholder feedback on its 
services and strives to improve public sector accountability through its activities and influence. 
In general, we were able to conclude that the OAG can demonstrate value to shareholders in 
many ways (as required under ISSAI 12).  
We also suggested practices that could be extended to enhance the value of public audit in New 
Zealand and potentially, elsewhere. The recommendations are, first, that public sector audit 
bodies should be independently inspected, as private sector auditors now are. Second, requiring 
auditees to report on internal control weaknesses will be valuable. There should be more 
disclosure about the membership and activities of audit committees. Finally, auditors should 
be more aware of the extent to which unaudited information is relied on by stakeholders, and 
to what extent it is confirmed by subsequent audited information.  
Further research opportunities are widespread in this area of research. These include greater 
documentation of public sector auditing in a wider range of countries, and more comparison 
between them, so that it becomes clearer how a variety of SAIs provide value to their 
stakeholders, and why variations exist. This examination could also extend into historic reasons 
for differences, and whether particular historic events or crises have influenced public audit in 
each country. More development of quantitative comparative studies (Blume & Voigt, 2011) 
that are further developed to take into account what is known about select committees, the role 
of the media and other aspects discussed above would be useful. There will be continuing 
opportunities for development due to continuing changes in the environment such as changing 
media interest, declining public use of published public sector accounting information, but 
increasing availability and use of online data. The challenge is for SAIs to be alert to the 
different reasons that stakeholders may demand audit in this unique context and to provide 
evidence of how they do this in a way that recognises how their needs differ from those of 
private sector stakeholders. The imperative to deliver value should continue to underpin the 
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Gaps in public sector 
evidence based on 
previous research (4) 
Evidence from this study (5) 
Agency Agency relationships, 
agency costs are 
ameliorated by audit 
Municipal structure; 
SAI and economic 
performance 
Limited evidence of 
audit being used to 
reduce agency costs 
Audit reports (some modified); reports to 
Parliament and Parliamentary committees; 
media and public attention (limited) 
Signalling Signalling of high quality 
audit should reduce costs 
of borrowing/ equity  
Auditing is a useful 
signal in the bond 
market 
Not much evidence of 




High quality audit (surveys, assessments, 
standards), high interest rates in New 
Zealand 
Insurance Auditor has ‘deep 
pockets’. Stake-holders 




Limited evidence of 
role of audit in 
providing insurance for 
stakeholders 




More levels of 
management generates 




the public sector 
leads to more 
accounting 
Limited evidence of 
role of audit in 
management control 
(audit mandatory) 




Governance and audit are  
complementary to reduce 
risk 
Governance and audit 
are substitutes to 
reduce risk 
Opposite results to 
private sector 
Audit committees; performance audits 
Confirmation Unaudited announcements 
are confirmed by audit 
--- (not studied) No evidence as yet Unaudited announcements; absence of 
evidence about confirmation 




Table 2: Data collected for study 
Data collected from Content/topic of data Participants/Source 
Interviews3 Stakeholders of audit, their demands and how these are 
met 
OAG staff 
Focus Groups OAG staff teams 
Attendance at public hearing 
of select committee (3/3/16) 
Post-audit review of 2014/2015 Annual Reviews of two 
State-owned Enterprises: Meteorological Service of 
New Zealand Limited and the Public Trust 
Relevant Members of Parliament, supporting staff, 
SOE staff 
Select Committee reports on 
entities (between 15/5/15-
14/5/16) 
Reports on performance of public sector entities on 
which the OAG had input (including through audit 
reports, reports on annual reviews and vote estimates, 
performance reports, and verbal advice 
162 Publically available reports by 14 different Select 
Committees * 
OAG’s Media Round Up New items that discuss public sector reporting and the 
OAG 
July 2015, November 2015, February 2016. 
Management letters Letters from OAG to entities post-audit including key 
audit matters and recommendations.** 
A sample of 45 management letters for a broad 
selection of larger entities 
                                       
3 Ethics approval was obtained from the relevant university committee for the interviews and focus groups. 
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Data collected from Content/topic of data Participants/Source 
Social media (posts between 
15/5/15-14/5/16) 
Engagement with public on matters of relevance to the 
OAG (These did not include references to financial 
reports or audit opinions) 
Facebook posts, Twitter, Instagram, Blog*** 
Surveys of perceptions of 
public sector audit** 
1. Perceptions of 10 interviewees (Select 
Committees, their Chairs and Treasury senior staff) 
2. Perceptions of 25 named interviewees (senior 
public officials and select committee Chairs) 
3. Surveys of audit clients 
1. Touchstone (in 2012 and 2013) 
 
 
2. Martin Jenkins Associates (in 2014) 
3. OAG (2016 sighted) 
OAG Annual reports and 
Annual Plan 
Financial data and summaries of audit activity Annual Reports for years ending 30 June 2011-2015. 
Annual plan for 2015/16. 
OAG Auditing Standards Include all International Audit Standards plus 
additional requirements/ commentary on public sector 
issues 
Version current as at 30 June 2016. 
* Data was downloaded from: http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/sc/documents 
*** These are internal documents to the OAG which were provided to the researchers in confidence. 







Illustration 1: The OAG reporting on management report recommendations (from the 2015 







Illustration 2: from the Auckland Council website  
Downloaded from 
http://www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz/EN/ratesbuildingproperty/ratesvaluations/billingpaymen
t/Pages/howyourratesarespent.aspx 17 May 2016 
 
 
 
